The Internet is a huge form of social capital that is not redudble in its characteristics to other forms of sodal capital, such as ordinary networks of people who more or less know each other. It enables us to do many things w ith radically greater efficiency than we could without it. It can do some things better but other things much less well than traditiona l devices can. At both extremes, the differences are so great as to be not merely quantitative but also qualitative. The things it can do better include things that can readily be checked and verified. The things that it often cannot do include securing commitments for action. A brief history of the forms of social cooperat ion suggests that relationships on the Internet are typically too thin to back t rust and cooperation a mong those w ho do not have fairly rich relations hips off-line.
Introduction
T h e Internet is a form of social capital t h at is n ot r educible in its ch a ract eristics to other forms of social capital, su ch as ord ina r y n etworks of people w ho m ore or less kn ow each other , organizations wh ose connections a n d talents may be ta pped by ' users', and so forth. The social capital of the Internet-w hich I w ill call Internet ca p ital to distinguish it from n etwork a nd or ganization al capital-is huge. It en a bles us t o do many things w ith r adically greater efficien cy tha n we could do them w ithout the Internet as an ena bler. Because the Inte rnet itself is en orm ous, wit h millia ns of p articipa nts in it, a typical indiv id ual 's contribution to its capital is negligib le. Ma n y other kinds of n etwork a re far sm alle r with far fewer part icipa nts. In these, a n indiv idual 's contribution can p r oportionately b e r elatively la r ge, so tha t my using t h e n etwork might incr ease its value to all other users . My contributions to the wealth of r esources available on the web, h owever , is p roportion at ely tiny. The re a r e som e a t ypical pa rticipants w ho ma ke m aj or contributions t h at a re enhanced by t h e very n ature of t h e Internet in its cap acity t o r each millia ns of people a t v irtually n o marginal cost t o the p er son pr ovid ing a benefit. If you p rogram a fix to, say, one of t h e notoriously frequently discovered flaws of a ny of the Microsoft oper ating syste ms, you can make tha t fix available to millian s of people. That fix is virtually a pure p ublic
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In an informal conversation many years ago, Thomas SeheHing estimated that the computer as word processor had more or less doubled the productivity of the more productive academics (doubling the productivity of some would add nothing to their total). One might now ask how great has been the effect of the Internetas a research tool, at least in certain fields, and perhaps in all academic and journalistic fields. My experience is perhaps indicative, even though I am not especially adept. I can now check vague memories of what someone wrote in a matter of minutes. I have a younger colleague who checks the Internet while we are talking by telephone and she finds sources for claims and the accurate wording of the claims almost instantly. Most of my generationarenot that adept, but even we can do what formerly would have been amazing things. In some areas it may prove to have enormous impact. For example, it enables lawyers on both sides of a case to find scores of prior decisions that fit the decisions they want in the case. Judge Richard Posner (private conversation) speculates that this will undermine the principle of stare decisis in the common law.
For all its magic, h owever, the Internet h as what seem tobe m ajor drawbacks that make it not m erely a high-speed analog of traditional dev ices. It can do som e things better but oth er things much less well than traditional devices can. At both extremes, the differences are so great as to b e not m erely quantitative but also qualitative. The things it can do better are things that can readily b e checked a nd v erified. The things that it often cannot do include securing commitments for action, whether for sponta n eous cooperation or well organized cooperation. To see b oth the limits and the p ossibilities, consider a brief social history of cooperation.
A Social History of Cooperation
In pre-historical times, p eople evidently lived in small groups of a hundred or two hundred people, mostly in ext ended families. In such a context, social cooperation can b e r eadily organized by the tightly interwoven interests of everyon e in the group. Each of us can enforce b ehavior according to communal norms. We b en efit from the m onitoring of all by all a nd probably also from the badgering and h ectoring of all miscrea nts by everyone else. Because each of us shares many inte rests with each other person in the group, we have strong incentive to be cooperative in order to m aintain the coop erative inclina tions of the others. But the te nden cy we know in modern times to generalize from such interests to some overall sense of the rightness of relevant behaviors might have affected even very primitive groups, which might have m oralized behaviors that serve interests. A small society, a nd n ot only a primitive small society, might not distinguish between normatively and pragmatically correct rules for behavior. Free-riding will be subject to sanction in a very small, close society, so tha t cooperative action can b e over-determined by the combination of moral and self-interest motivations; your moral commitment to the group and its benefits from cooperation will be reinforced by the fact that it will be in your interests to cooperate in order to avoid sanctions. In a larger society, large enough that each individual does not know all the others, or even a large fraction of them, there is likely to b e some need for regulation of relationships beyond those whom we know well and with whom we have extensive ongoing rela tionships. Without such regulation, free-riding can undercut alllarge-scale cooperative ventures.
This brief history parallels David Hume's account of the evolution of social order. His account is what Rudolf Carnap (1 962, 5 76-7) would call a rational reconstruction. It is supposed to be a plausible story of social evolution beca use it is based on an articulate expla natory account of how cooperation can be sustained at various scales of society. It starts with two evident facts: that orderly, stable societies have existed at the very small scale and at the very large scale that permits anonymity toward most people. We need explanations of the order at these two scales of society and, for some purposes, we might also want to have an account of the evolution from small to large scale. The latter is not important here; we need only to understand how order can be achieved at these two scales so that we ca n then determine what kind of order to expect for life on the Inte rnet a t its grand iose scale. It is maintena n ce, n ot cr eation, of order tha t we n eed to explain in order to grasp h ow cooper ation works in our lives. On Hume's account, social order can take two quite d iffe rent forms. First , in a very sm all societ y such as tha t of a sm all Indian tribe of North America in Hume's t ime, order can follow fro m conven tions that can gover n b eh avior in condition s of the general transpa r en cy of everyone's actions to everyon e else. Such a societ y can be organized by n orms, althou gh this is n ot Hume's term (the t erm w it h its modern force would h ave b een unavailable in his time).
1 He speaks of conventions. H e is in fact the inventor of the idea of a convention t h at is the result of rep eated coordination on on e of the p ossible coordination outcom es for various inter actions, such as the rules for d etermining the right of su ccession of monarchs, the rules of prop erty, the rules of the road , a nd so on. Once we esta blish such a convention , such as tha t for driv ing on the right in N orth America, that convention is self-reinfor cing in the very st ron g sense t h at each ind iv idual will find it in h er inter est to a bide by or acquiesce in the conven tion. Ma ny n orms are de fac to coordination conventions (Lewis 1969; Ha rdin 1982 , ch ap ter s 10-14; a nd 1995, chapter s 2-4) .
In Thomas Hobbes's state of n ature t h er e is neit h er justice n or prop er ty (n or right n or wron g) . Hume agrees that in a Hobb esia n sta te of nature the re would b e neither justice nor inj ustice, t h ere would b e no prop erty, a nd life would b e grim. B ut he thinks t his is an "imagina ry stat e", a philosopher 's device, n ot a historical st a te of affairs (Hume [1 739-40] 1978, 3.2.2, 501 ) . For him ther e is a n inte rmediate p osition b etween t his state of n ature (which did notever exist) and a large societ y such as ours w ith its ela bora t e government. That intermediate posit ion is a small society that is regulated by conventions. T h ose conventions migh t add u p to some perha ps minimal sense of justice. T his differ en ce in v iews turns on Hume's richer theoretical grasp of strategic possibilities in his theory of convention as applied to the iterated interactions of a small society (Hardin 2004, chapters 1 and 9).
Instead of Hobbes's war of all against all in a state of nature, in a small society we face a substantially contrary condition: the monitaring of all by all. And we are therefore all basically reliable in our dealings with each other and toward our collective interests. As we now know from many anthropological studies of small, relatively primitive societies, they can work without any heavy machinery of government and with relative spontaneity of action by everyone. They enjoy spontaneous order.
Hume's second form of social order is that of a large and at least moderately complex society in which we are not all known to each other and in which monitoring and individual-level sanctioning of miscreants cannot be expected to guarantee generally good behavior by all. It would be impossible to regulate such a society with nothing more than norms and reciprocity. In such a society we need government to restrain us from harmful actions and probably even to compel us to beneficial collective actions.
In our much la rger societ y, we too can enjoy spontaneous order in many relation ships, especially those tha t a r e on going . But if our exchange rela tions a re restrict ed to the small numbers w ith w hom we can repeatedly inte ract, we face a serious loss of opportunities that we could enj oy if we could also guara ntee reciprocal fulfillment of even isolated exch anges. Moreover, even in ongoing relation ships, we cannot trust one another t o abide by exch a n ges that involve very la r ge values, so that our r elationships will still b e restricted. For example, to wh om would you sell your h ouse on a legally unenforceable contract t o p ay you a large m onthly sum for the n ext twe nty years? Hence, even if we do not go all the way w ith Hobbes in thinking t hat unregulated social interactions would b e consta ntly murde rous, as in his state of n ature, we must agree with him that they would b e radically poorer tha n what we could hav e under a properly functioning government.
In b oth these states there must be som e sense of justice tha t provides for social order. Under a regime of su ch justice, there could arise principles of p ossession, alt h ough in the conditions of the primitive t ribe the ra n ge of things tha t could come under the rubric of possession might be extrem ely sm all and restricted. In a n omadic pastoral society, our goats, sheep, or cattle might count as individual possessions. In a hunter-gathe rer socie t y, almost n othing might count as indiv idual p ossessions. In neithe r case would la nd count as a possession, although my tent might describe a n a r ea onto which you sh ould n ot en croach while we a re in this particular place.
Note that the sm all primitive society could lack government a nd could be relatively a narchic but n evertheless well-ordered, with each of us free to do as we please much of the time but with very clear exp ecta tions a b out behaviors in m a ny contexts of importa n ce to our group. A s a na r chists h ave long insisted, ther e can be order in a narchy. Hume says, "An Indian is but little t empted to disp ossess a n oth er of his hut , or to steal his b ow, as b eing already provided of the sam e advantages; a nd as to a n y superior fortune, which m ay atte nd one a b ove another in hunting and fishing, 'tis only casual and temporary, and will have but small tendency to disturb society" (Hume [1739-40] 1978, 3.2.8, 539) . Hence, despite its lack of government, the society need not descend into the violence and virtual war of Hobbes's state of nature. I have nothing to gain from attacking or stealing from my neighbor. Indeed, if I do steal, my theft would commonly be known to all in the society and I might suffer powerful sanctions.
Hume therefore specifically says that he disagrees so much with the Hobbesian vision of the state of nature that he supposes that government arose not in order to deal with disorder within society but to allow for better organization of defense against those outside the society who might attack it (Hume [1739 (Hume [ -40] 1978 . Hume says the "state of society without government is one of the most natural states of men, and may subsist with the conjunction of many families, and long after the first generation" (ibid., 541). The difference between Hobbes and Hume here might primarily be in the greater body of empirical evidence on the North American Indians when Hume wrote, almost exactly a century after Hobbes first wrote. 2 Hobbes presumably had no evidence for his speculative claim that the Indians lived in the brutish manner of a war of all against all (Hobb es [1651] 1968, chapter 13, [63] 
187).
We now h ave extensive eviden ce on societies tha t ma n age without p owerful governmen ts. We also h ave the evidence Hobbes had tha t w ithin our highly governed societies, we can h ave unregula t ed excha nges without such fear of b eing a bused as t o dissuad e us from a ttempting to coop er ate w it h othe rs. Hume seems to understa nd b oth of these a r en as for successful coop er ation. On the second, his eviden ce is not mor e impressive tha n H obb es's. Ther efore, his b etter underst a nd ing seems to com e from better theory, namely his theory of convention.
Althou gh it would b e p ossible to maintain a ver y small societ y indefinitely w ithout government, Hume ([1739-40] 1978, 3.2.8, 541) says, "t is impossible they shou'd m aintain a socie t y of a ny kind w ithout justice" , w hich entails three funda m ental p rinciples concerning (1) the sta bility of p ossession, (2) its transfer by con sent from one own er to a n other, a nd (3) t h e p erforma n ce of promises (or contracts loosely defined) .
3 Hume calls these laws of nature b ecause they a re d e fact o a ntecede nt t o government in the sense t h at t hey a re sociological principles. Hume's three laws of n ature a r e eleva ted to t heir high st atus by the fact tha t they a re en ormously useful in enabling us to have stable expecta tions a nd t o invest our efforts in indiv idually b en eficial en deavors t h at h ave b en eficial implica tion s for the whole societ y. Seen ex a nte, his three laws are mutually b en eficial. Adher ence to each of t h ese laws is a sine qua n on of coop era tive social order.
We ca n full y understa nd these laws of n a ture a nd still act as though they did n ot govern our behavior. Indeed, in all three cases, it is n ot even gen erally clear what it would mean for a single individual to act according to the derived laws or principles.
4 Hume says, "I should be the cully of my integrity, if I alone shou'd impose on myself a severe restraint amidst the licentiousness of others" (Hume [1739-40]1978, 3.2.7, 535) . That would be too much to expect, especially of a rational, moderately self-interested person. One can be obliged to follow the dictates of the laws of nature in only two contexts: first in a society small enough that it can be regulated by spontaneously enforced and obeyed norms; second in the context of a political society under a government that will enforce them as legallaws.
Hume supposes that government would get its first authority from these principles, which could be established before formal government arises (T3.2.8, 541). It is only with greater prosperity and larger scale that we might come into such serious conflict with each other as to need government to regulate our behavior. Although adherence to the principles of justice would be sufficient to maintain any society, it would be impossible for us to observe those principles in a large society unless we have government to enforce compliance with the principles (543). Hume's general concern is with social order, for which stable property relations are n ecessary but, of course, not sufficient. Moreover, in addition to his 'laws' of property, which we might call n orms , the re could be ma ny other n orms t o r egulate behavior and to h elp secure social order. Such norms might lie outside the law while supporting law. For example, our small community might h ave strong n orms regula ting coop era tion in many contexts and our norms might differ from those of a neighboring community tha t is under the same government and laws.
Trust as Encapsulated Interest
Trust evidently arose historically in resp on se to a world in which we do n ot know everyone but need n evertheless t o rely on m a ny others for various things. The very t erm trust is a late addition to the English la nguage and it h as yet t o gain full currency-with b oth a n oun a nd a verb form-in many langu ages (Hardin 2002, 57-8) . Substantial division ofla b or in essence created the need for making sure that oth ers will be relia ble while they do things that are complementary to what on e do es oneself. In m a ny contexts in modern lives, we cannot even judge the competence of those who do particular and very importa nt things for us. For example, most of us cannot fully judge the competence of our doctors, lawyers, or other professionals, or of agents of various organizations, esp ecially including government. Yet we need them because we do not know what they know and ofte n cannot judge the validity of wh a t they do. The students at the universities a t which I have taught often cann ot generally judge the competen ce of their teachers. What they often can judge is how moved they are by the teachers, or how entertained.
There are many accounts of trust that make it quite varied in content, possibly more varied in academic treatments than even in the vernacular. For the issues here, the most useful conception is of trust as encapsulated interest, as follows. If you and I have an ongoing relationship in which we reciprocally do things for each other, and if I am quite sure that you value that relationship enough to want to continue it, then I trust you because you de facto encapsulate my interests in your own. That does not mean you will never violate my trust or even tha t I would believe you will never violate it. It merely means you have a strong interest in fulfilling my trust (Hardin 2002) . Clearly, we cannot be in vast numbers of relationships such as this. Hence, trust as encapsulated interest cannot regulate our interactions with everyone. I will henceforth mean only this form of trust.
Some of the other accounts of trust are utterly implausible as explanations of why we behave cooperatively. Most of them inadvertently are accounts of trustworthiness, even though they are wrongly la beled as theories of trust. Among credible alterna tive accounts are trust that is grounded in an assessm ent of the other person's m oral or psychological commitments. If I know you a re morally committed to fulfilling a ny agr eement for cooperation that you en ter into either explicitly or implicitly, then I can trust you in this sense. If I think you h ave a strong commitment to being the kind of p er son wh o is reliable in coop erative ventures, simila rly, I can trust you. Neither of these con ceptions of trust can likely apply to m a ny, if a n y, relationships over the Internet or even rela tionships offline. Trust as en capsula t ed interest is far mor e comm on than either. But each of these three conce ptions probably a pplies to some interactions.
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In gen eral, on the Inte rnet , trust as en capsulated interest is likely to work only if we h ave a n offline r elationship that gives us each more knowled ge about each other than we could typically get from me rely a n Internet relationship (without a n agging worry whether all that knowledge is true). Our problern here, therefor e, is to determine how we can come to b e confident of our Internet relation ships. We also face that problern for our d ealings w ith m a ny, p erhaps most p eople offline. We can canvass the devices tha t h elp us offline to see whether they could also work online. Ma ny of them cannot, b ecause our r ela tionships on the Inte rnet a re too focused a nd n ot thick enough.
One of the devices we have t o secure trustworthy b eh avior from those on w h om we h ave to rely, even though we would not trust them in any strong sense, is to h av e third-pa rty certification of som e kind. This can range from the adv ice of a trusted neighbor who says that a p lumber is good t o the b acking of a professional or institution al body that tests or has opportunity to evaluate competence. It could also include cases in which the third party mor e or less guarantees the p erformance of someon e we a re in n o position to trust but with w h om we would like to b e able to coop erate on som ething.
It is commonly noted that trust arises where there is the substantial risk of default, or untrustworthy behavior. If there were exceedingly little risk that another would default-for example, if the other were acting at gunpoint to do our bidding-it would be pointless to speak of trust. If we are to establish trust in some relationship, then we will have to face some risk, repeatedly, that means we have a real stake in the judgment of the relationship. With no risk, we might wrongly suppose we come to know someone well enough to judge how they will behave. But if we have faced them repeatedly in contexts in which we are both at risk, we can finally know with great confidence whether the other is reliable and-perhaps even more important-we can know whether the other has an interest in maintaining our relationship and therefore has not only the competence but also the will to fulfill our trust.
In very anomic contexts, we cannot typically have either kind of information about those with whom we interact: neither the very general knowledge of their competence nor the personally very specific knowledge of their interest in fulfilling our trust.
What are the risks that we take over the Internet that we can successfully handle so that our 'partners' on the web do not take unreason able advantage of us? For commer cial dealings, we do take some risks, althou gh we substantially reduce these in the same way we do in comme rcial dealings off the web. We rely on d ealer s' reputa tion s. This is n ot a backward-looking estimate of their character, but a forward-looking claim about their interests. Reputation is comm only repr esented as backward-looking . I think this is almost always a mist ake for issues that might involve risky exchanges a nd trust. A store's reputa tion is m ore importa nt by far to t h e st ore t han it is to m e. Therefore t h e st ore cultivat es a good re putation. The d ealers we wish t o buy from a r e those wh o care a b out their juture reputa tion and w h o the refor e h ave a n interest in d ealing equitably with us as a way of investing in their future r eputation. This is the nature of J ohn Mueller's account of the early histor y of Wanamaker's d epartm ent stor e in Philadelphia. J ohn Wa n a ma ker saw tha t h e could attract far more customers if h e could conv ince people tha t his p olicy was not caveat emptor-let t h e buyer b eware-which was t he policy of v irtually all sellers in his time. He t h erefor e advertised t hat his stor e would t a ke b ack a nyt hing it sold for a full r efund , n o questions asked (Mueller 1999, 79~80) . When I deal w it h Amazon.com , I think of it no d ifferently t h an I think of a m a jor department st ore on Lexington Avenue. It is a business that n eed s re p eat cust omers . And its success suggest s tha t it h as figured out how to keep its custome rs coming back for m ore.
In my commer cial dealings with stores, trust is n ot a n issu e. Competen ce is the wh ole story. I want them to be competent in serv ing their custom er s well. I wa nt them t o be compet ent in understanding that their future reputation is importa nt to them a nd in understan d ing t h at they want r epeat c ustomers, n ot one-time c ustom ers whom they could r eadily cheat without con cern for the future. Shopping over the Internet does not add any significant complication over t he n ormal n ature of our offline d ealings with stor es. It is in othe r a r eas where trust is a bsent tha t the devices for ensuring relia ble b ehavior b ecome important. As discussed below, the only major category of such problems might be in the u se of the Internet for email for various purposes.
The most obvious feature of the Internet for this discussion is that it is a vast collection of networks. Offline networks commonly enable us to build up trust relationships. Often these are very limited and focused. Let us therefore specifically address the possibilities for network trust.
Trustworthiness in Communities and Networks
Recall Hume's account of the rise of a large society with a government from earlier forms of small communities. In small, close communities cooperation can be managed by the rule of norms that are backed by spontaneaus sanctions from the members of the community itself. Hence, those members are essentially trustworthy in their dealings with each other. Even today, many of us live at least parts of our lives insmall 'communities' in which norms govern much of our behavior toward each other. But large parts of our lives arenot regulated by close communal ties a nd the spontaneaus sanctions to which they give rise. We live in mor e nearly urba n context s in which we inter act with large numbers of p eople, ma ny of whom we m ay never expect to see again afte r a single inter ac tion. M ore significantly, we h ave ongoing r elationships w ith extensive n etworks of p eople. We secure what we n eed through multiple networks, som e of the m overlapping in part but som e of them essentially sep arate from other s (see furt h er , Cook / H a rd in 2001). In these contexts, we commonly develop trust rela tionships in the sense of trust as encapsulated inte rests . We reciprocate favors over many years with p eople whom we grow to t rust because we value our rela tionships w it h them and we suppose they value their r elationships with us.
Alt h ough t here are exceptions, most of our relationships over the Internet cannot have the qualit y of small, close communities tha t a re sp onta n eously regula ted by n orms. But they also cannot usually fit the structure of trust relations, beca use su ch r elations are typically embedded in n etw orks or a r e built up in dyadic relationships tha t go on for a long time. It is difficult to imagine devices that would work for trust on the Internet with people w ho do n ot have further inte raction s w it h each other off the Internet, interactions in w hich trust could b e grounded. We can h ave smallish n etworks tha t h ave more or less sta b le membership a nd that are involved in frequ ent interactions on t h e Internet. But the trust relation s tha t n ormally gr ow in iterated a nd n et work interaction s offline grow ou t of interactions in which t her e is som ething at stake, often som ething very significant at stake. I do things for you and you do t hings for m e a nd we trust each other with respect t o som e ra n ge of things.
On the Internet, w he n there is something of significant value at stake, the potential partners t o a n exchange do n ot know each other from b efore a nd might t ypically not expect ever t o e ncounter each other again. Only a n ongoing , st able institution , such as Amazon.com or the website of a t r aditional ret ailer can expect to b e judged by its reputa tion because only such an entity can h ave en ough interactions w ith others to b e a ble to esta blish a reputation. Su ch an entity does not need to trust its customers, who can obtain goods or services only by first paying for them. Indeed, Internet retailers do not even suffer the steady lasses of shoplifting that affiict real stores.
A striking case of intensive activity on the Internet is by those who play Internet games, which are games that are on the web and that players can enter into or exit from more or less at will. Players can number into the millians and can come from anywhere on the globe (Turkle 1996) . They are typically anonymaus to each other, although each can have a name for purposes of the game so that players know with 'whom' they are playing in the limited sense of knowing whether any player was in the game before. Such Internet game players do not need trust or any normative constraint, such as reciprocity or fairness, to be able to play in orderly ways. Their moves are constrained by the computer program. Their interactions do not have the free form of ordinary life, although freer form can presumably be increasingly programmed into such games. The players form a network that is both gigantic in the number of agents in the network and tiny in the form of what the network manages for them. Some of them might spend forty hours a week in the game, so that it is quantitatively a la rge part of their lives. It might also ta ke on a la rge psychological role for them. But it rem ains highly focused a nd unlike the m elee of ordinary life. It finally bears little resembla n ce to what we call n etworks in our lives offiine.
At the nearly opposite extrem e are self-help groups in which people may bare their p erson al problems for each other to discuss. Typically, the members of such groups go by na m es that d o not reveal their actual identities. Indeed , in some cases members of such gr oups have been discovered to be dishonest in pretending to be like the m embers of the group when they are quite different. While such a group works, h owever , the m ember s may develop trust relations . They are consta ntly at risk of being attacked and sometimes even of being exposed, esp ecially if ther e are Internet savvy members of the group who can ferret out the real world identities of participants.
For m ost of our d ealings on the Internet, trust is n ot a n issue virtually by definition because we face no risk of a n y significance. In ma ny oth er dealings, the b iggest risk is violation of our privacy, for example, as the result of uncontrollable wider publication of an embarrassing email or, as in the self-help group, the discovery of our actual ide ntity.
Enabling Cooperation
In our kind of society, we have coop er ative relations within dyads of close friends or relatives; within subcommunities tha t a re sm all and close enough t o be regulated by norms; in exchange relations in varied n etworks that a r e regulated by the force of the iterated exchange incentive a nd its proxy in reputation; and in institutionally protected exchanges. It is only in the first a nd third of these-----dyadic exch ange r elations and cooperative r elationships or ganized within network s tha t are t y pically r estricted to specific issues-that trust as en capsulated inte rest is funda m entally important. For the small community devices of n orms a nd san c-tions to work, relationships must be relatively thick. Network exchange relations commonly involve relatively thin relationships that are focused on narrow issues, such as doing reciprocal favors over some range of issues. Dyadic relations can range from the narrowly focused to the nearly all encompassing, as in a good marriage (Franz Kafka might add: if there hasever been a good marriage). 6 The use of norms grounded in communal sanctions will commonly not work for so decentralized and vast a system as the Internet. A principal reason for this is that the users of the Internet are not also involved with each other in manifold other venues or in overlapping networks, and they do not need to be. I may not even know who is the other personor people with whom I deal; and the other or others may evaparate into the ether at any moment. Potential endgame effects are apt to loom much larger in Internet than in real-world interactions. Endgame effects of instant withdrawal are likely to be relatively rare in small community relations and even in friendship relationships, although there can be sudden blow-ups that lead to complete breaks even in such relationships. I may be involved offiine with many of those with whom I deal over the Internet, but not with most of the people who might use the Internet to abuse my interests in some way. For the former, the n orms that govern our interaction s will oft en t ypically precede the Internet in our relationship or will h ave tra nscended our relation ship ov er the n et.
The Internet is the m ost extre me version yet establish ed of an exceedingly la rge a n omic society. In its Greek origins, a n omic m eans lawless; in con tempora r y English it m ore often m eans normlessn ess. Much of our use of the Internet is normless. Moreover , almost all of it is lawless. One can commit fraud over t h e Internet, and t hat would b e su bj ect t o legal action. But many p eople sp end mor e tha n a thousand hours a year on the Inte rnet a nd a re never involved in a nything that would rise to the lev el of legal scrutiny-unless they happen to download copyrighted music or videos. In its normlessness a nd anony mity, the Internet h as some of the ch a ract eristics of urba n life during those p e riod s when on e is a nony mously walking the street s a nd m eeting n o on e wh om on e knows. But it goes far b eyond such a n omic interactions in tha t it oft en actually involves exch a nges and even som e d egree of d ep endence on one another. Ve ry little, if a ny, of our sta ndard vocabula ry for d escribing a nd explaining huma n relation ships fits many of our relationships on the Internet.
Nevertheless, the Internet is en ormously valua ble t o us. It e na bles us t o do ma ny things tha t would otherwise b e extrem ely difficult or even nearly impossible. In my milieu , for example, I can use the Internet to find out things tha t it would take days to discover t hrough traditional m eans, su ch as libra ry r esearches. It provides-or is-a n ovel form of social capital. Often wh en I a m seeking a fact on the Internet, the sources on w hich I stumble t urn out to b e the sam e sources I would h ave consulted in traditional search es. Som etimes, however, t h ey turn out t o b e the websites of industrious h obbyist s wh ose catalogs of facts a nd st ories a r e a la bor of lov e. Once I do find out som ething, h owever, I can then very efficiently d ouble-ch eck it in traditional ways or by consulting traditional sources~ such as newspapers and encyclopedias~over the web. For me, the Internet is~apart from its email function and its capacity to deliver documents instantly~primar ily a device for discovery of facts, but I am not finally dependent on it for verification of facts. 
What the Web Enables Us to Be
It would be interesting to draw up a catalog of the peculiarities of the life of the Internet. One is discussed very entertainingly by Sherry Turkle. Turkle says of herself that, on the Internet, she is a "multiple, distributed system". She is a clinical psychologist, social scientist, author, professor, and cyberspace explorer, where she travels under many identities or names. She could do, as many of those she has studied do, far more and travel under essentially untraceable names that could let her act out any persona she chooses over the anonymous Internet. We cannot do that as readily, if at all, in real life. 8 Therefore her title, Who Am We? She supposes, however, in the contemporary post-modern vision that we are, in some meaningful sense, all of these identities, that we are multiple in nature (Turkle 1996) .
Turkle h as been characterized as the a nthropologist or ethnogr aph er of the Internet , although it might be more accurate to see her as a psych ologist of the Internet. She a rgues that "computers a r e not just changing our lives but cha nging ourselves" (Turkle 1996) . In a sense, she is generally interested in answering the question what~or who~the Internet ena bles us tob e. She focuses on what the Internet does to us. I am h ere more gen erally interested in what the Internet enables us to do. I want to understand w hat it can do for us . This focus pushes us to study the Internet as a form of social capital. We can invest in tha t capital, as millions of people a nd institutions are doing, thereby increasing the value of the Inte rnet to other s, and w e can put it to use, as even more millions are doing.
Turkle h as interviewed many players of online games, mention ed earlier, to d etermine what the p laying , usually anonymously, do es for them when there are well over a million regular pa rticipa nts over a long p eriod of time from many societies. Those facts alone make it sound like a n important social phenomenon that we might want to understa nd. If we are to determine the larger social effects 7 If one u ses anything from a hobbyist's website, verification can be a maj or issue. Websites and online m essage boards recently have defended Kobe Bryant aga.inst sexual assault charges with extraordinary venom dire cted at the woman rnaking the charge and everyone associated with h er. It is exceedingly unlikely that these Intemet-assisted libelers have any knowledge on which t o base their cla.ims. They have only energy and partisan comrnitments. Getting caught up in the thrall of a sports fan evidently reduces a person's IQ by approximately 23 points. Because news networks and television stations want their own websites to have many hits, they put in links to the irrespon sible sites. CBS, for example, can get thousands of hits w hile keeping itself formally out of the lib elous debate, which it merely enables others to enter with great er ease (Roberts 2003) . 8 One of the most remarkable cases of adopting an identity is J ohn Howard Griffirr (1960) who had hirnself b lackened so that h e could travel the South in the United St ates in 1959 in order t o experience the life of racial discrimination. and significance of this phenomenon, we need to know who the people are and what are their larger roles in the society. Or in Turkle's language we need to know more about the people that they are outside their personas as players in the game.
Those who are interested in the phenomenon of television in contemporary lives do studies of such things. Television watehing similarly occupies a large part of many lives, upwards of forty hours each week. (That is hard to imagine, because it is equivalent to six hours every day, say from 6:00 until midnight every evening.) For some of these people television is not a substitute for life in other forms but is merely an entertainment during lives that would otherwise be even more empty and lonely. For many, however, it is thought to be a majoralternative to living in supposedly more interesting ways. Robert Putnam thinks that the distractions of television have substantially reduced the social capital that comes from participation in various social groups and organizations (Putnam 1995; 2000) .
Eventually, we should want to have similar accounts of the effects of living life on the Internet. Presumably, Internet gaming does some of what television does to social participa tion. Quite possibly, h owever, this claim is wrong, b ecause the gamers might b e people w ho a r e only loosely connect ed t o the kinds of gr oups a nd organizations tha t interest Putnam and other crit ics of t elevision. M ayb e, in Putna m's m etaph or, they would be b owling alon e with or without the Internet , a nd ma ny of t h em m ay be esp ecially attracted to the Internet in large part b ecause it allows them t o b owl alon e and anonym ously. P erhaps they would not b e more socially active even if the Internet collapsed. Of course, it could b e the case t h at computer usage from an early age h as cr eated p a rt of the p erson alities of those w ho a re now turned off of st a nda rd categories of social participation. What we need , if we a re to understand such worries a nd loose claims, is ha rd studies that go b eyond a necdot al st ories of particula r individuals, as inter esting and su ggestive as these a re.
Internet Pneumatique
Among t h e most striking asp ects of t h e Interne t is the ease with which on e can write letters and thereby maintain rela tionships across massive d istances and long times. I a m involved with a fairly large number of em ail corr esp ondents, but for us the Inte rnet is mer ely a convenien ce. It is true that the convenien ce m ay be so dramatic t hat it cha n ges our relationships, much the way t h e relationships of P a risia n s in t h e time of Ma r cel Proust or of Czechs in Prague in the time of Franz Kafka must h ave b een changed by the fact that they could exch a nge several letters in a single day by use of t he pneumatique. Such quick exchange may tend to h eat up the contents of the exchanges and therefore the rela tionships themselves.
The ease and alacrity of email also ch a nges the scale of our corresp ondence. I receive and write upwards of a d ozen realletter s a d ay in exch a nges with real associates, and in addition I get nudged several times daily (I d o n ot count these as real letters). Before email, I wrote and received far fewer letters. And I very seldom received letters from people I did not know. After being out of the country for more than a week some time ago, I returned to find more than three hundred real messages (after deleting the roughly equal number of junk emails). I did not quickly make it through that backlog and some of it may have died of neglect. There are probably people in the world who are offended at my inattention. Yet I spend more than an hour daily doing email-there were few days before email when I spent so much time on such correspondence.
For Turkle, Internet romance via email is a major topic. For many of us, presumably it is not a major part of our lives, but for some it apparently is. It is possible that the distancing of the Internet is actually an enabler for initiating romantic attachments because one can come to know a lot about another person's sense of humor, intellect, and character more generally in a remarkably safe venue in which it is relatively easy just to drop the correspondence and the correspondent at will.
9 If the relationship seems appealing, it can always be transferred to the real world. I am told by someone whose authority is probably great that email romancers know that they should attempt a meeting soonb efor e they d evelop a strong attachment t o someon e they would never have liked in person. Without su ch a m eeting, they a re at risk of falling in love with a n ether eal p erson a, not with a p erson, but eventually suffering t h e a nguish of a broken rom a nce w ith a real p er son. Email, weirdly, h as returned us t o the era of the troubadours, w ith their fa n cifully embellish ed b elov eds admired from a great distance. This is a context in which a person might h ave something a t risk so tha t there is at least a p ossibility t h at trust would a rise. The r isk is t h at, in order to pursue the rela tionship furthe r, on e must eventually reveal on e's identity. Indeed, su ch revelation is likely to be a n elem ent in demonstrating on e's trustwort hiness a nd, ther efore, in est ablishing a trust relationship. Again, for trust to be at issue, ther e h as to b e som ething at risk tha t will b e lost in the event of untrustworthy behavior by t h e trusted p er son. For many of us, especially in our lives in business, the professions, and academia, we a re mor e or less fully exposed in m a ny ways on the web. We h ave websites t h at include lots of info rmation, som e of w hich could readily be linked to other sources t o fill in m a ny gaps. One could say-in the vac uous vernacula r-that on e trusts everyon e else with all of t his information. It would b e far more m eaningful to say that on e thinks it worth the risk to put out so much information, b ecause it en a bles on e to m a ke connections that would b e valuable. For academics, easing t h e way for others to read our work is likely to b e beneficial t o us. There m ay b e heightened risks (for example, of plagiarism or v icious criticism) from su ch easy exposure, but they seem likely tobe outweigh ed by the b en efits.
g Such r omantic involvem ents might be risky in ways that only the Internet can threat en . A couple of years ago, one of t h e Stanford University server s was r eported t o h ave randomly r eaddressed emails of people with last names beginning with the first three letter s of the alphabet. Boastful emails about a.ffa.irs h av e b een r e-sent t o th ou sands of p eople, h ave made it into the international press, and have r epa.id th e b oast er s with grim r epercussions, including lost jobs.
Even while we are exposed in such hopefully constructive ways, we can also lead relatively secret lives on the web by the use of other email names through anonymaus providers. To do so is somewhat cumbersome for those who arenot very heavily invested in browsing and using the web, because it means checking mail on different systems. For those who are a bit klutzy, this sets up opportunities for embarrassment when using the wrong address fully identifies the writer or chat room visitor.
There is an apparently complex and specific aspect of the regime of email that has not been adequately addressed. Within organizations, people often develop paranoid cognitions and engage in dysphoric ruminations about their colleagues. A reason for this is that often they have too little information about what the colleagues actually think, and psychologically they tend to assume that no information is bad information (Kramer 1994; 1998) . What seems like ordinary paranoia is often justified, especially in contexts in which there is a clear or potential conflict of interest or a power differential (Cook et al. 2004, chapter 4) . Paranoid cognition is perhaps especially prevalent in international relations, especially in contexts in which there is a serious risk of conflict and even hostility. Interna tion al r ela tions are ther efor e perhaps thought to b e far mor e hostile than they a re in objective fact. P a ra n oid cognition is not itself justified by objective grounds for fearing a nother, but if there is a n y reason for concern, tha t concern is apt t obe h eighten ed by communications that a r e very terse, as e mail communications commonly are. The medium seem s t o encourage efficient brevity, 10 a nd the re is not enou gh time for exte nsive responses to all our emails. The re is not much t o read between the lines w he n there are only on e or two lines. The medium t ypically lacks t he exp a nsive graciousness of much of traditional letter writing . It also lacks visual clues to wh at the corresp ondent might mean, in pa rticular it misses cues tha t suggest that the correspondent is smiling rather tha n scowling . Of course, it also lack s the ton es of voice that su ggest the m ood of a person over the t elephone. The use of cryptic funny faces as punctuation marks must oft en h elp, as though the writer were saying, "Don't take tha t seriously" . Unfortunately, such faces h ave b ecome too common to b e very revealing a nd t h ere a r e seldom scowling faces to give us a n accur ate m easure of real varia tion in mood. Having no baseline, we evidently sometimes invent one.
Insofar as para noid cognition and dysphoric rumination a r e in substantial part responses to the te rse quality of email and its common lack of tacitly informative cues, the Internet may often actually foster distrust even when t h ere is n o objective reason for it and may exacerbate it w hen t her e is at least some reason for it. Ther e is n othing additionally a t sta ke in email correspondence beyond wh at would b e a t stake in traditional forms of communication , a nd yet the form may cause us to resp ond and act as though there is. P a rt of that form is its instantan eity.
Concluding Remarks
What makes for trust in ordinary contexts is the richness of our iterated interactions. The richness makes the relationships more valuable so that we want to maintain them; and this is our evidence of each other's trustworthiness. Internet relationships typically are very narrowly focused on what would be merely a piece of an ordinary relationship. In this respect, Internet relationships are more nearly like commonplace commercial relationships, in that they are often not repeated but are one-shot. For commercial dealings, however, we have the devices of the market for establishing and correcting reputations that give us and our commercial partners incentives to behave well. It is that broader set of relationships that secures our commercial dealings. If we have a richer relationship with someone with whom we have Internet dealings, that richness most likely comes from our further interactions offiine. There may be a few Internet relationships that become moderately rich, as long-standing self-help groups reputedly do. But the bulk of our Internet dealings that are not merely extensions of offiine relationships are too focused and pared down for them to rise to the level of grounding trustworthiness and securing trust.
We could conclude that we n eed devices for securing reliable inte ractions on the Internet. Or we could conclude contrariwise that the Internet is inherently n ot very useful for handling the kinds of problems tha t dyadic trust as en capsulated inter est , small-community n orms, offiine ne twork connections, and third-pa rty enforcers h andle in the offiine world. So fa r , it appear s that the latter conclusion is correct . The one area in which trust seem s to b e at issue on the Internet is in ordinary communication v ia email. But this is an a rena in which m ost of our dealings are with people with wh om we haveext ensive offiine dealings. The ease of using email might facilitate the stre ngthening of our trust relation ships with those with whom we are already connected a nd with t h ose who come to us with third-party commendation. It might also facilitate the quick breakdown of a r elationship if paranoid cognition comes into play.
The case for and against the importa nce--or even the r elevance or possibilityof trust on the Interne t is still open. If we have even a bit of pa ranoid cognition about science, we might conclude that the case is gen erally against trust if no one has yet shown tha t trust matters . At the moment, what we n eed if a positive case is to be mad e is explanations of h ow trust can a rise, be stren gth en ed, and b e tested on the Internet. That would include an account of just what kinds of risk w e face on the Internet when it enables others t o work against our inte rests. For many of us, trust is b eside the p oint in a ny case, except perhaps in our email exchanges, b ecause the Internet is m erely a form of social capital tha t we can put to use w ith sometimes extraordinary r esults-a nd som etimes gr eat fr ustr ation. It is merely the analog of a very large, extremely well organized library whose content can be scanned almost instantly coupled with an even higher speed and internationalized pneuma tique.
In this it is like other categories of social capital. It is also like them in that to use it well requires substantial human capital. I have two r esearch assistants who v irtually waltz through the Internet with dazzling ease and grace. It is human capital such as theirs and of the programmers of various search engines, such as Google, that makes the social capital of the Internet so valuable.
Although it may sound perverse to put it this way, the central issue in making the web be more richly useful to us, beyond its being a quick research and communication tool, is how to create networks on the Internet that approach the richness of the networks most of us have in our offiine lives. So far, the Internet, the biggest network of all history, may have almost none of the value of usual networks. Those who have hoped the Internet might enhance participatory democracy and civic life more generally might be disappointed in its performance so far. Many of us may be happy enough with its powers of research and communication. It is not only a new form of social capital, it is also a new form of network. It is at once extraordinarily extensive and remarkably shallow in its reach.
